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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LUIS HERMOSILLO-ANTOLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 46555-2018
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR-2018-418

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After

Luis Hermosillo-Antolin pled guilty to possession of a controlled

substance and grand theft, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of six years, with one
year fixed. Luis now appeals, and he argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Luis by Information with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), grand theft for taking clothing, grand theft for possession of a stolen
revolver, and misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.64–65.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Luis pled
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guilty to possession of a controlled substance and grand theft for the revolver. (R., pp.99–100,
101–04; Tr., p.15, L7–p.16, L.25, p.17, L.19–p.18, L.14.) The State agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges. (R., p.101; see also R., p.107 (motion to dismiss), p.114 (order of dismissal).)
The State also agreed to recommend the district court retain jurisdiction (“a rider”). (R., p.102.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a rider, with an underlying aggregate sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1–2.) Luis requested the district court impose an
indeterminate sentence, with zero years fixed, or place him on probation. (Tr., p.21, L.17–p.22,
L.1.) He made this request because he understood that Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) would put a “hold” on him and begin proceedings to deport him to Mexico. (Tr., p.21,
Ls.23–24, p.22, Ls.12–13.) He also submitted to the district court that the eight months he had
already served pending sentencing was sufficient punishment, especially in light of his looming
deportation. (Tr., p.22, Ls.2–17, p.25, Ls.12–14.) He expressed that he did not want to go on a
rider. (Tr., p.22, Ls.7–8, p.23, Ls.4–5.) In response, the State argued probation was not an
appropriate punishment. (Tr., p.23, L.14–p.24, L.21.) The district court sentenced Luis to four
years, with one year fixed, for possession of a controlled substance, and six years, with one year
fixed, for grand theft, to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.29, Ls.12–17.)
Luis timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.111–12,
116–18.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of six years, with
one year fixed, upon Luis, following his guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance and
grand theft?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Six Years,
With One Year Fixed, Upon Luis, Following His Guilty Pleas To Possession Of A Controlled
Substance And Grand Theft
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Luis’s sentences do not exceed the statutory maximum. See
I.C. § 37-2732(c) (seven year maximum for possession of a controlled substance); I.C. § 182408(2)(a) (one year minimum, fourteen year maximum for grand theft). Accordingly, to show
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Luis “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460 (2002). Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing
alternatives, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118
Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
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Here, Luis asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should have placed him on probation or imposed less fixed time in light of the mitigating factors,
including his young age, difficult childhood, acceptance of responsibility, and immigration
consequences.
First, Luis’s age and troubling childhood support a more lenient sentence. Young age is a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
when he committed the instant offenses. (Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”),1 pp.3–4.) It is no surprise that Luis committed these offenses, and has a juvenile record,2
in light of his traumatic childhood. See State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001)
(recognizing a defendant’s “extremely troubled childhood is a factor that bears consideration at
sentencing”). Luis’s mother brought him to the United States illegally when he was one month
old. (PSI, p.12.) He grew up in California and saw “a lot of violence, gangs, and drugs.” (PSI,
p.12.) He never met his biological father, who was a drug addict. (PSI, p.12.) Fortunately, he had
a close relationship with his mother, but his stepfather ignored him and his siblings except to
discipline them. (PSI, p.12.) His family lived paycheck to paycheck. (PSI, p.12.) In addition to
his unstable household, Luis was physically and emotionally abused by his older brother, and he
was sexually molested twice by family friends and once by a church leader. (PSI, p.12.) His
family also struggled with substance abuse. Luis’s brothers all abused drugs and alcohol. (PSI,
p.12.) Similarly, Luis first drank alcohol at age five and first used drugs at age twelve. (PSI,
pp.15–16.) He started smoking methamphetamine at age fourteen. (PSI, pp.15–16.) Since then,

1

Citations to the PSI refer to the seventy-five page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
2
Luis had a juvenile record, but this was his first offense as an adult. (PSI, pp.6–11.)
4

he used methamphetamine at least once a week. (PSI, pp.15–16.) He also abused inhalants,
prescription medications, and over-the-counter medications. (PSI, pp.15–16.) In California, and
later in Idaho, Luis joined a gang and stole for money. (PSI, p.12.) He “had friends die,” and one
friend died in his arms, but was revived by first responders. (PSI, p.12.) Luis described his
childhood as “rough,” and he had to “‘grow up’ quick.” (PSI, p.12.)
Despite his difficult upbringing, Luis accepted responsibility for his actions and was
remorseful. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of
mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Luis recognized his criminal behavior
“was an immature, impulsive[ ] decision,” and he felt “regret and empathy for my victims.” (PSI,
p.6.) He valued his family, God, and helping others. (PSI, p.17.) He hoped to get an education
and have a stable, normal life. (PSI, p.17.) He enjoyed attending church and spending time with
his family. (PSI, pp.12, 17.) At sentencing, he was upfront about his juvenile record, and he told
the district court that he had “come to taking accountability for my actions.” (Tr., p.25, Ls.3–6.)
He explained he attended AA, NA, twelve-step meetings, and church while in jail. (Tr., p.25,
Ls.7–9.) Luis’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse support a lesser sentence.
Finally, Luis’s immigration status stands in favor of a lesser term of imprisonment or
probation. See State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 402 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he effect on
immigration status is an appropriate consideration for a trial court in fashioning a sentence or
considering Rule 35 relief.”). While in jail, ICE officers met with Luis and told him that they
would start deportation proceedings after his sentencing. (PSI, p.11.) Luis believed he would be
deported to Mexico. (PSI, p.11.) Luis expressed concern about his deportation because he had
not lived in Mexico since he was one month old. (Tr., p.25, L.18–p.26, L.1.) He argued the
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consequence of deportation was significant enough to justify a lesser sentence. (Tr., p.25, L.18–
p.26, L.1.) The district court should have given more weight to this factor at sentencing.
In summary, Luis asserts the district court failed to exercise reason and therefore abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of six years, with one year fixed. Proper
consideration of the mitigating factors supported a more lenient sentence of zero fixed time or
probation.
CONCLUSION
Luis respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of March, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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